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I. BACKGROUND
One of the few exceptions to the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel is in the area of workers' compensation law. All
* Attorney, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, West Virginia. B.S., West Virginia University, 1976;
J.D., West Virginia University, 1979.
Mr. Crouser practices primarily in the area of workers' compensation law. He formerly served
as Executive Secretary of the West Virginia Compensation Fund, from 1987 to 1988, and was State
Tax Commissioner between 1988 and 1989.
1
Crouser: Reopenings and Modifications in West Virginia Workers' Compensati
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LA W RE VIEW
states have provisions for changing "final" rulings in workers' com-
pensation claims, sometimes long after a judgment or final order
has been entered.' The ability to reopen or modify workers' com-
pensation claims, as noted by Professor Arthur Larson in his trea-
tise, is a recognition of the fact that no matter how competent the
evaluation of a claimant's condition and earning prospects may be
at the time of the initial hearing, the condition and earning prospects
may later improve or change markedly for the worse.2
Claim reopening cases represent a large portion of workers' com-
pensation litigation in West Virginia. For example, of the 41,3121
computer-generated protest acknowledgment letters4 issued by the
West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund between January 1,
1988 and September 30, 1989, 8.8% (3,664) pertained to reopenings.5
Additionally, an estimated 40% of the computer-generated protest
acknowledgments during that period related to permanent partial
disability (PPD) awards . Most of those protests resulted from reo-
penings not initially in litigation, but which subsequently were pro-
tested after the PPD award was made.7
The power and jurisdiction of the West Virginia Workers' Com-
pensation commissioner (hereinafter "commissioner") over each
1. 3 A. LARoN, THE LAw OF WOR.mEN'S COMPENSATION § 81.0 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Interview with John E. Farley, Director of Medical Case Management, West Virginia Work-
ers' Compensation Fund, in Charleston, West Virginia (December 15, 1989) [hereinafter Farley In-
terview].
4. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 (1985 & Supp. 1989) requires that the commissioner give notice in
writing to the employer, the claimant or dependent, as the case may be, of his action, and allow
thirty days upon receipt of such notice for written objection to such findings before the order becomes
final. If an objection is made, the claim then goes into litigation. Hence, the term "protest letter,"
and "protest acknowledgment letter."
5. See Farley Interview, supra note 3.
6. Permanent partial disability awards are typically made by the commissioner after the claim-
ant has reached his maximum degree of medical improvement, as determined by a physician. The
PPD award is based on the percentage of the claimant's "whole-man impairment," either based on
the statutory tables set forth in W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(0 (Supp. 1989), or on the opinion of the
expert medical evaluator(s). A PPD of 85% or more is statutorily deemed a permanent total disability.
Id. § 234-6(d). The PPD award is computed on the basis of four weeks' compensation for each
percent of disability determined, not to exceed 66 2/3% of the average West Virginia weekly wage.
Id. § 234-6(e).
7. In addition to the computer-generated protest acknowledgments, the Fund generates an
unquantified amount of personally-generated protest acknowledgments, primarily originating from the
Legal Division.
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workers' compensation case is continuing.' The commissioner has
the right, after due notice to the employer, to make any changes
of former findings or orders "as may be justified." 9
The statute allows both the claimant and the employer to petition
for a change in any workers' compensation award, even after an
order has been entered by the commissioner. 0 (For purposes of this
article, actions by the claimant for such change will be referred to
as "petitions or applications for reopening," and actions by the
employer will be referred to as "applications for modification.")
Typically, the claimant petitions to reopen his claim for an ad-
ditional PPD award or for additional temporary total disability (TTD)
payments." He may also seek to reopen his claim because he believes
he is entitled to medical benefits for his injury, 12 to vocational or
physical rehabilitation benefits, 13 or to a permanent total disability
(PTD) award. 14
8. Id. § 23-416 (1985).
9. Id.
10. Id. §§ 23-5-la, 23-5-ic.
11. Upon a finding that a claimant has sustained a compensable injury (a personal injury
received in the course of and resulting from his covered employment, as set forth in Id. § 23-4-1
(Supp. 1989)) which causes disability lasting longer then three days, the commissioner commences
payment of temporary total disability payments, which continues until the claimant has reached his
maximum degree of improvement. Even if the claim previously has been closed for TTD benefits or
the claimant has been awarded a PPD, the commissioner must commence payment of TTD benefits
again, if the claimant suffers further TTD or requires further medical or hospital treatment resulting
from the compensable injury giving rise to the former award. Id. § 23-4-1c(e). The claimant receives
70% of his average weekly earnings as his TTD benefits, not to exceed the average weekly wage in
West Virginia, but not less than one-third of the average weekly wage in West Virginia. Id. § 23-4-
6(a).
12. Payment for medical and hospital treatment is set forth in Id. § 23-4-3(b) (Supp. 1989). A
claimant is entitled to payment of medical and hospital treatment which relates to his compensable
injury if he needs such treatment, even if his claim has been previously closed. Id. § 23-4-lc(e).
13. The statute provides for physical and vocational rehabilitation of a workers' compensation
claimant who has sustained a permanent disability or injuries likely to result in permanent disability.
Total expenditure for vocational rehabilitation cannot exceed $10,000, but the claimant is entitled to
TTD benefits while he is undergoing vocational or rehabilitative treatments. Id. § 23-4-9 (1985).
14. A claimant is deemed to be permanently and totally disabled if he: (i) has a permanent
disability rating of 85% or more, id. § 23-4-6(d) (Supp. 1989); or (ii) has lost sight in both eyes, lost
the use of both hands or both feet, or one hand and one foot. Id. § 23-4-6(m). In making such a
determination, whether the claimant has a disability which renders him "unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he
has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time .... ." is also
3
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The statute requires only that a claimant's application be filed
in writing and within the applicable time limits.15 It also requires
the commissioner to pass upon the merits of the application within
thirty days after its filing. 16
Likewise, an employer may seek modification of a claim. This
is typically done when there is evidence that a claimant on TTD has
reached his maximum degree of medical improvement,' 7
II. THE APPLICATION PROCEDURE
Both the petitions for reopenings and modifications are filed with
and considered by the commissioner. 8
A. Reopenings
Currently, a claimant uses a WC Form 125 to petition for a
reopening of his claim. Frequently, the application will be accom-
panied by supplemental medical reports, hospital admission records,
x-rays, etc., to strengthen his argument that his claim should be
reopened. This is the stage at which the claimant attempts to es-
tablish a "prima facie cause" for reopening his claim or presents
a new fact to the commissioner not previously considered. 9 "Prima
facie cause" means "any evidence which would tend to justify, but
not to compel, the inference that there has been a progression or
aggravation of the former injury." ' 20
considered, Id, § 23-4-6(n).
Claimants often seek what is commonly referred to as "Second Injury life awards" under the
provisions of Id. § 23-3-1 (1985), when they have definitely ascertainable physical Impairment caused
by a previous injury or injuries or compensable disease which, in combination with the compensable
"second" injury, causes them to be permanently totally disabled through the combined effects of
both. In the case of a Second Injury life award, the employer is charged only for the PPD due to
the "second" injury, with the remainder of the PTD award charged to the Second Injury Reserve
Fund. Id.
15. See infra, Ch. IV, § B.
16. See Eggleton v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 158 W. Va. 973, 214 S.E.2d 864
(1985).
17. See infra Ch. III, § B.
18. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-16, 23-5-la, 23-5-ic (1985).
19. Id. § 25-5-lb.
20. Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 364, 370, 234 S.E.2d 779,
783 (1977).
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Upon receipt of the claimant's application form, the commis-
sioner provides the employer with a written notification that the
claimant wants to reopen his claim and whether or not he has es-
tablished a prima facie cause for reopening. If the claimant has met
this burden, the employer is advised by this notice that the com-
missioner will reopen the claim for TTD benefits within ten days
unless the employer demonstrates just cause, in writing, why the
claim should not be reopened. 21
The "10-day notice" 22 provides the employer with an opportunity
to submit medical or other evidence in rebuttal. That evidence may
question the timeliness of the claimant's petition, show that his dis-
ability is due to a cause other than a compensable injury, dem-
onstrate that he is not temporarily disabled, or assert any number
of applicable reasons to support the employer's position that the
claim should not be reopened.
After consideration of any evidence from either party, from the
claim file, or an independent evaluator, the commissioner then issues
a written protestable order 23 which either reopens the claim or denies
the claimant's petition to reopen. Each party has thirty days in which
to file its objections in writing to this protestable order. 24 The com-
missioner is then required to schedule a hearing on this order25 within
thirty days after the objection is filed. 26 The hearing must be held
at the county seat of the county in which the injury occurred or in
any place agreed upon by the parties. 27
21. The commissioner's rules require that reopening petitions for PPD must be ruled upon
within ten working days from the receipt of the petition by Worker's Compensation Fund personnel.
85 C.S.R. 6-4.6(a) (1986). There is no necessity for an advance evidentiary hearing for the commis-
sioner to take action on a reopening petition. The commissioner can base his action, instead, on the
information supplied by the parties or on medical evaluation reports he has obtained independently.
Honaker v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 893, 896 (W. Va. 1982). (citing Mitchell
v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 107, 107, 256 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1979)).
22. 85 C.S.R. 6-4.6(a) (1986).
23. W. VA, CODE § 23-5-I (Supp. 1989).
24. Id.
25. Id.; Mitchell, 163 W. Va, at 120, 256 S.E.2d at 10.
26. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 (Supp. 1989). It should be noted that hearings are rarely held this
soon.
27. Id. The hearing may be postponed by agreement of the parties or by the commissioner
"for good cause." Id. Supplemental hearings are permitted, and typically do occur, often in various
locations, depending on where the evaluating physicians practice.
1990]
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The hearing process allows parties to present expert medical eval-
uations and reports, supply other relevant evidence, cross-examine
witnesses including the claimant, etc.28 At the first hearing or at a
subsequent hearing, 29 the claim is "submitted" by both parties for
a decision by the commissioner. The commissioner then has thirty
days in which to render a "final order," either affirming, reversing,
or modifying his former action. 0 Either party then has thirty days
in which to appeal that "final order."'"
The procedure for petitioning for a reopening for additional PPD
benefits is essentially the same as that provided for TTD reopenings,
except that the commissioner has thirty days, instead of ten, in which
to respond to the petition. 32 Typically, the PPD reopening petition
is based upon a report by a physician selected by the claimant, who
recommends a percentage of impairment higher than that previously
granted. If the petition meets the requirements of the statute, 33 the
commissioner enters an order holding that a prima facie cause for
reopening for additional PPD has been made and will then refer
the claimant to an independent physician of the commissioner's
choosing for an examination. 34 Upon receipt of that physician's re-
port, the commissioner enters a protestable order, either granting
the claimant additional benefits or finding him fully compensated
by the earlier award(s).
Litigation and appeal procedures for final orders pertaining to
PPD reopenings, as well as reopenings for PTD, medical benefits,
28. The employer is entitled to obtain the claimant's medical records for litigation purposes
under W. VA. CODE § 23-4-7(b) (1985).
29. The commissioner's rules allow the objecting party one year from the date of acknow-
ledgment of the protest in which to complete its presentation of evidence. Subsequent to the objecting
party resting its case, the defending party or parties have another year in which to present rebuttal
evidence, and the commissioner may extend this two-year period for good cause. 85 C.S.R. 7-2.1 l(b)
(1986). Note that this rule is much less vague than the hearing continuance procedures set forth in
W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 (Supp. 1989). Until recent months, the "One-Year Rule" has not been strictly
enforced.
30. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 (Supp. 1989).
31. Id. The appeal process is discussed infra Ch. V, § C.
32. 85 C.S.R. 6-4.6(b).
33. See infra, Ch. III, § A.
34. It is the commissioner's responsibility to determine the percentage of disability to award
a claimant by examining the physicians' findings and determining from such reports the amount of
existing disability. Haines v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 152, 155-56, 150 S.E.2d
883, 885-86 (1966).
[Vol. 92
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and vocational or physical rehabilitation, are the same as for TTD
reopenings.
B. Modifications
The employer may also make an application in writing for a
modification of any award previously made.35 Although the statute
makes reference to "any award previously made,"' 36 an employer
typically makes an application for modification to terminate ongoing
TTD benefits.
In such cases, an employer will usually file an application based
on an expert medical opinion stating that the claimant has reached
his maximum degree of medical improvement. For example, doc-
umentation is sometimes provided which demonstrates that the
claimant is engaging in activities inconsistent with his alleged injury.
Occasionally, some new evidence not previously considered by the
commissioner, such as evidence demonstrating that the claimant is
disabled due to some non-occupational or pre-existing condition,
may become available and serve as grounds for an application for
modification.
In addition to considering the material contained in the em-
ployer's request for termination of TTD benefits, the commissioner
is required to consider information provided by the claimant. Ad-
ditionally, the commissioner may rely on information already in the
claimant's file, and may direct the claimant to undergo an inde-
pendent medical evaluation before a determination is made on the
employer's application.37 In any event, if the employer's application
discloses "cause for further adjustment ' 38 of the claimant's benefits,
the commissioner is required, after due notice to the claimant stating
35. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1c (1985).
36. Id. (emphasis added.).
37. Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 107, 120, 256 S.E.2d 1,
10-11 (1979).
38. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1c (1985).
1990]
7
Crouser: Reopenings and Modifications in West Virginia Workers' Compensati
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the factual basis therefor,39 to make such modification with respect
to the former orders "as may be justified. '40
Any party dissatisfied with the modification order is entitled,
upon timely and proper objection, to a hearing. 41 If an application
for modification is denied, the commissioner must issue a protestable
order within sixty days and the employer has thirty days thereafter
in which to file a written objection.42
It should be noted that in situations in which the employer has
failed to protest the original TTD order, it cannot protest subsequent
TTD orders. Instead, its remedy is to file an application for mod-
ification. 43
Where an employer's application for modification is successful
and TTD benefits are terminated, those benefits cannot be termi-
nated retroactively; the termination is effective as of the date of the
commissioner's order. 44 The date of termination usually is subse-
quent to a physician having found that the claimant has reached
his maximum degree of medical improvement.
III. TBE GRoUNDs FOR CANGES
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (hereinafter
"court") generally has interpreted the jurisdictional provisions of
the statute strictly with respect to parties seeking changes in workers'
compensation awards. The court has held that the commissioner's
final order cannot be modified or vacated except by a proper appeal
or by a petition for reopening. 45 The commissioner has no power
39. Yacomolish v. State Compensation Comm'r, 110 W. Va. 79, 157 S.E. 45 (1931). No ev-
identiary hearing is required upon an application for modification of TTD benefits before those
benefits are terminated. Mitchell, 163 W. Va. at 122, 256 S.E.2d at 11. Procedural due process
standards mandate, however, that the commissioner give the claimant advance notice of the reasons
why his TTD benefits may be terminated and give him a reasonable opportunity to supply relevant
information on the issue. Such notice is not required, where the claimant has returned to work.
Honaker v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 893, 894 (W. Va. 1982).
40. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-Ic (1985).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 23-5-id.
43. Butcher v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 315 S.E.2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983).
44. Fakourey v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 551, 554, 258 S.E.2d 526,
528 (1979).
45. Dismond v. State Compensation Comm'r, 148 W. Va. 26, 31, 132 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1963).
[Vol. 92
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or jurisdiction to vacate, set aside, or modify a final order unless
it appears that he originally lacked jurisdiction to enter the order
or that it was procured through fraud or mistake.46 A "mistake"
of the magnitude to justify setting aside an award must be something
more than an erroneous decision by the commissioner.47
A. Reopenings
The reconsideration of a claimant's prior award cannot be based
on evidence substantially the same as that which was before the
commissioner when the claim was closed.4 Facts which were in the
record at the time of the initial award are treated as already having
been considered by the commissioner. 49
It is not sufficient for the claimant merely to show that he has
a disability greater than that for which he was compensated by the
original award. 0 For example, the court has held that if there was
evidence of a particular type of disability before the commissioner
at the time of the original award, such as psychiatric disability, a
claimant cannot later reopen the claim for an additional award for
that psychiatric disability, even if his claim for the psychiatric por-
tion of his disability was originally denied.5 1
For a claimant to obtain a reopening, his petition must disclose
that there has been a worsening5 2 a "progression or aggravation"
of his condition, 53 or "some other fact or facts which were not
theretofore considered by the commissioner in his former findings,
and which would entitle such claimant to greater benefits than he
has already received. ' 54 If the petition fails to establish at least one
46. Dickerson v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 7, 13, 173 S.E.2d 388,
392 (1970); Partlow v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 150 W. Va. 416, 420, 146 S.E.2d 833,
835 (1966).
47. Stewart v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 103, 108, 144 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1965).
48. Burdette v. State Compensation Comm'r, 111 W. Va. 299, 301-2, 161 S.E. 556, 557 (1931).
49. Taylor v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 409, 151 S.E.2d 283 (1966).
50. Perry v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 602, 607, 165 S.E.2d 609,
612 (1969).
51. Taylor, 151 W. Va. at 415, 151 S.E.2d at 286.
52. Phillips v. State Compensation Comm'r, 114 W. Va. 648, 651, 174 S.E. 561, 562 (1934).
53. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-Ib (Rep. Vol. 1985).
54. Id.
1990]
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of these criteria, the commissioner must issue a protestable order
notifying the claimant and employer that the application fails to
establish a prima facie cause for reopening the claim." The court
has held that the question of whether a prima facie cause has been
established is one of fact, not law,5 6 so each petition must be con-
sidered on its own merits.
Currently, a reopening petition is considered by one of the Fund's
fifteen medical claims analysts assigned to that task. These analysts
are not required to have any special medical or legal training; they
are trained "on the job." Practitioners who deal with the Fund on
a regular basis may find that the responses by these analysts to
reopening petitions vary widely. While some strictly require objective
medical findings which demonstrate a progression or aggravation of
the claimant's condition, other analysts seem to interpret court de-
cisions to mean that almost any evidence at all is sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie cause for reopening.57 For example, often a
physician's stated opinion that there has been an "aggravation or
progression" of the claimant's condition, without objective findings
to support that opinion, is enough to obtain a reopening order.
Any party dissatisfied with the reopening order has the right to
protest it. Furthermore, that party is entitled to a hearing if the
protest is timely filed.5 8
B. Modifications
For an employer to obtain modification of an award, the ap-
plication must be in writing and disclose a cause for adjustment of
the award.59 The application for modification must disclose some
fact or facts not theretofore considered by the commissioner in his
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Perry, 152 W. Va. at 608, 165 S.E.2d at 612.
57. In Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 364, 234 S.E.2d 779
(1977), the court held that to obtain a reopening, a claimant need only provide "evidence which
would tend to justify but not to compel the inference that there has been a progression or aggravation
of a former injury," and that the Workers' Compensation Act should be "liberally construed." Id.
at 370, 234 S.E.2d at 783.
58. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-la (1985).
59. Id. § 23-5-1c.
[Vol. 92
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former findings. 60 Practical experience demonstrates that the em-
ployer must present the commissioner with substantial evidence in
order to be successful. An example would be a videotape showing
the claimant engaging in activity contrary to his alleged injury.
The modification standard to which an employer is held appears
to be stricter than is required of the claimant seeking a reopening.
For example, the court has held that a PTD award can not be set
aside except for "good cause," and in order to modify a PTD award,
it must affirmatively appear that the claimant's condition had "ma-
terially improved" over that shown to exist when the PTD benefits
were originally awarded. 61 In one case, an employer's uncontroverted
affidavits alleged that the claimant had worked at heavy manual
labor for several months after a PTD award, and had been accorded
no special privileges because of his physical condition. The court
held that the employer was entitled to have the claim reopened for
a hearing. 62
In considering an application for modification of TTD benefits,
the commissioner is required to take into account any information
supplied by the claimant, in addition to that supplied by the em-
ployer. 63 Additionally, the commissioner may rely on information
already in the file and may refer the claimant to an independent
medical evaluator before acting on the employer's application. 64 This
contrasts sharply with the grounds for reopenings, in which the com-
missioner relies almost entirely on the claimant's evidence to de-
termine if there is a prima facie cause for reopening.
As with reopenings, responses by the commissioner to applica-
tions for modification must be in the form of protestable orders.
Such orders allow any objecting party a full evidentiary hearing.65
60. Id. § 23-5-1d.
61. Blosser v. State Compensation Comm'r, 132 W. Va. 112, 126, 51 S.E.2d 71, 78 (1948).
62. Id.
63. Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 107, 120, 256 S.E.2d 1,
10 (1979).
64. Id. at 120, 256 S.E.2d at 10-11.
65. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5-1c, 23-5-id (1985).
1990]
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IV. THE COMMSSIONER'S SCOPE OF AuTHoiTy
A. Broad Powers
The statute provides that the commissioner shall have "full power
and authority to hear and determine all questions within his juris-
diction," including those pertaining to changes with respect to for-
mer findings or orders. 66 The commissioner's powers in this regard
have been described by the court as "broad." 67
In a reopening or a modification proceeding, the commissioner
may make such changes with respect to former findings or orders
"as may be justified." 68 The court has held that a liberal interpre-
tation must be given the statute. 69 As long as an award falls short
of PTD, the claimant has the right to have his claim reopened, if
he satisfies the requirements of the reopening statutes, i.e., filing
the application wiihin the prescribed time limits and establishing a
prima facie cause.7 0 Once a reopening or modification has been
granted, the claimant is not restricted to those issues for which the
reopening was requested.7 1 The claimant not only has the right to
contest a modification with rebuttal evidence, or to develop fully
the issues regarding progression or aggravation in his reopening pe-
tition, but he may also develop "any other facts which were not
previously considered by the commissioner in his original find-
ings. Y 72
B. Time Constraints
The primary restraint on the commissioner's continuous juris-
diction over a workers' compensation claim is the statutory time
66. Id. § 23-5-1.
67. Honaker v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 298 S.E.2d 893, 896 n.2 (,V. Va.
1982).
68. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5-Ia, 23-5-Ic (1985).
69. Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 107, 114, 256 S.E.2d 1,
7 (1979); Wilkins v. State Compensation Comm'r, 120 W. Va. 424, 428, 198 S.E. 869, 871 (1938).
70. Bragg v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 706, 712, 166 S.E.2d 162,
165 (1969).
71. Boggs v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 413, 418, 256 S.E.2d 890,
893 (1979) (quoting Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 364, 370, 234
S.E.2d 779, 783 (1977)).
72. Boggs, 163 W. Va. at 417, 256 S.E.2d 893 (1979).
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limitations for filing applications for reopenings or modifications.
The statute prohibits "further awards" from being made in fatal
cases after two years from the date of death. 3 A further award for
a non-fatal injury must be made within five years after payment of
TTD benefits has ceased, or not more than two times within five
years after the last PPD payment was made in the original award
or any increase thereof.74 If no award has been made in the claim,
a change may be made only within five years after the date of injury. 75
A further award can be made for medical benefits at any time. 76
The court has held that these statutory time restraints are ap-
plicable only to the reopening of a claim previously closed by a
commissioner's final (appealable) order.77 These time periods are
jurisdictiona 8 and the commissioner cannot reopen a claim after
the expiration of the relevant time period.79 On the other hand, there
does not appear to be any time constraints upon the employer in
making an application for modification.
There are good reasons for time limitations on reopenings.80
Without such limits, for example, the commissioner would have to
preserve the full case record of all claimants who have ever received
any kind of award. Even with microfiche and computerization, keep-
ing records of all claims, and never being able to purge them, would
be cost-prohibitive. Secondly, any attempt to reopen a claim on an
ancient injury would necessarily present awkward problems of proof,
since it would be difficult to determine the relationship between the
73. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-16 (1985).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Craft v. State Compensation Director, 149 W. Va. 28, 33-34, 138 S.E.2d 422, 425 (1964).
78. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5-Ib, 23-5-1d; Taylor v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W.
Va. 409, 415, 151 S.E.2d 283, 286-87 (1966); Turner v. State Compensation Comm'r, 123 W. Va.
673, 677, 17 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1941).
79. Stroupe v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 415, 422, 152 S.E.2d 544, 548
(1967). The time periods for seeking a reopening may be extended or excused, however, if either party
within a period of time equal to the applicable time period requests an extension, showing good cause
or excusable neglect. In considering whether there was "good cause or excusable neglect," the com-
missioner may consider whether the applicant was represented by counsel and whether the applicant
or its representative actually received timely and proper notice. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1(e) (Supp. 1989).
80. See, 3 A. LAnsON, supra note 1, § 81.10.
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old injury and the present disability. Finally, the commissioner could
never accurately determine, even with the best available actuarial
studies, what kind of future liability the Fund could anticipate in-
curring for reopened claims and, therefore, would have difficulty
computing appropriate reserves. The problems of anticipating lia-
bility would be a difficult, if not an impossible task for self-insured
employers as well, if there were no time constraints on reopenings.
V. THiE REvIEw PROCEDURE
A. Due Process Afforded
Throughout the statutes pertaining to reopening and modification
of workers' compensation claims, the West Virginia Legislature has
provided for due process of law for all parties.8' All parties must
be given adequate notice and a chance to object and offer evidence.
Adequate response time for an objection or appeal is allowed for
the commissioner's rulings or orders,82 and the time periods can be
extended if "good cause or excusable neglect" is shown by the ap-
plicant.83
B. Burdens of Proof
1. Background
Generally, in a workers' compensation case a claimant has the
burden of proving his claim 84 by a preponderance of the evidence.85
81. The court has held that the purpose of the modification and reopening statutes is to afford
employers and claimants "the right and opportunity, by a procedure substantially similar for each,
to obtain, in a proper case, on grounds specified in the statutes, modification of any previous award."
Blosser v. State Compensation Comm'r, 132 W. Va. 112, 123, 51 S.E.2d 71, 76-77 (1948).
82. W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5-1, 23-5-lb, 23-5-id (1985 & Supp. 1989); Id. §§ 23-5-la, 23-5-1c
(1985).
83. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-le (Supp. 1989). This language was added to the statute by the Leg-
islature in 1986 in response to Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901
(,V. Va. 1982), in which the court had held that the statutory time limits under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act were not jurisdictional. Id. at 905. The statute restored the jurisdictional status of the
time periods, but allowed an exception in appropriate cases. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-le (Supp. 1989).
84. E.g., Myers v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 766, 772, 239 S.E.2d
124, 127 (1977).
85. Eady v. State Compensation Comm'r, 148 W. Va. 5, 11, 132 S.E.2d 642, 646 (1963).
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There have been several court decisions in the past two decades
which have effectively lightened the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" requirement applied in most civil cases. What is left is a
very light burden of proof for the workers' compensation claimant.
The "Rule of Liberality" has done the most to lighten the clai-
mant's burden of proof. That rule states that it is the duty of the
commissioner to construe liberally the evidence in favor of the claim-
ant.86 While the Rule of Liberality is not found in today's West
Virginia statute, the court began molding it soon after the genesis
of the initial Workmen's Compensation Act passed in 1913.87 It con-
tinues with unabated force to govern the construction of the Act to
the present day,88 even though the original statutory phrase "justly
and liberally" was omitted from the Act in 1919, 89 and has not been
restored to the statute. While the Rule of Liberality does not relieve
the claimant of his burden to provide proper and satisfactory proof,9°
he can meet his burden of proof with circumstantial evidence. 91 A
claimant is not required to prove to the exclusion of all else, the
causal connection between his injury and his employment. 92
In other workers' compensation laws we find variations of the
Rule of Liberality which perhaps are more equitable. For example,
in federal black lung cases, the courts have developed the "True
Doubt Rule." 93 Under that rule, if the conflicting evidence is in
equipoise, the claimant prevails. However, where conflicting evi-
dence is not "equally probative," the rule is not applicable.94 In
86. E.g., Buckalew v. State Compensation Director, 149 W. Va. 239, 245, 140 S.E.2d 453, 456
(1965).
87. Culurides v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 696, 699, 90 S.E. 270, 271 (1916).
88. E.g., Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 58, 62-63, 232 S.E.2d
343, 345 (1977).
89. 1919 W. Va. Acts 465.
90. Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 883, 887, 189 S.E.2d 838,
841 (1972).
91. Sowder v. State 'Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 889, 892, 189 S.E.2d 674,
676 (1972).
92. Id.
93. Conley v. Roberts and Shaefer Co., 7 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-309, 310 (1984); Kozele
v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 6 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-378, 384 (1983); Provance v. United
States Steel Corp., 1 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-483, 485 (1978).
94. Conley, 7 Black Lung Rep. at 310; Kozele, 6 Black Lung Rep. at 384; Provance, 1 Black
Lung Rep. at 485.
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federal black lung litigation, the trier of fact (the administrative law
judge) has the discretion to determine if the evidence is "equally
probative." If the ALJ's decision not to apply the "True Doubt
Rule" is supported by substantial, rational evidence which is in ac-
cordance with law, that decision will not be disturbed upon appeal.95
In contrast to the federal black lung system, the court in West
Virginia workers' compensation cases frequently utilizes the Rule of
Liberality to set aside the findings made by the triers of fact (the
commissioner and Appeal Board). The court frequently has held that
the Rule of Liberality means that the claimant must prevail if he
has any evidence in support of his position, even where there is
overwhelming evidence to the contrary from the employer and the
commissioner's independent examiners.96 For this reason, there are
annual attempts by the employer community to legislatively modify
the Rule of Liberality in West Virginia.
In short, the court has held that the burden of proof in workers'
compensation cases is simply not as great for the claimant as that
required in civil actions. Additionally, the court will not observe the
rules of evidence as rigidly. 97
2. Reopenings
If possible, the court has made the burden of proof for a re-
opening even lighter than the burden of proof generally applied in
workers' compensation litigation. The claimant is required only to
establish a "prima facie cause" for the initial reopening of his claim.98
The court has held that a "prima facie cause" means any evidence
which would tend to justify, but not compel, an inference that there
95. O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs. Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965). See also, Mucker
v. Director, OWCP, 7 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-492 (1984); Kozele, 6 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-378.
96. See, e.g., Helmandollar v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, No. 19099 (W. Va. October
19, 1989) (per curiam); Heneger v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, No. 18935 (W. Va. May 16,
1989) (per curiam); Francis v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, No. 18642 (W. Va. February 23,
1989) (per curiam). Although not directly related to reopening or modification, these cases are examples
of the court applying the Rule of Liberality to justify reversing the findings of fact of the commissioner
and Appeal Board, where the preponderance of the evidence weighed heavily against the claimant.
97. Sowder, 155 W. Va. at 893, 189 S.E.2d at 676.
98. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-lb (Supp. 1989). If there is no protest to the initial reopening ruling,
the claimant is "home free"; a prima facie cause is all he will ever have to establish. Id.
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has been a progression or aggravation of his former injury.99 A
prima facie showing does not always have to depend on a showing
of a "progression or aggravation." It may depend on "some other
fact or facts."'' 00 A claimant does not, however, demonstrate a prima
facie cause merely by showing that his original PPD award was
inadequate. 10 The court has inferred that when the commissioner
enters an order finding a prima facie cause for reopening and the
employer protests and litigation ensues, the claimant's burden of
proof increases to a preponderance of the evidence "blended" with
the Rule of Liberality. 0 2
Clearly, if the medical evidence supporting a reopening is un-
contradicted or the examining physicians are unanimous in their
findings of progression or aggravation, then the claim must be re-
opened. 03 To the contrary, where examining physicians have found
no physical disability entitling the claimant to a greater award, then
the commissioner cannot, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, reopen
the claim."14
In the more typical case where there are conflicting medical re-
ports and testimony, the commissioner must make an independent
determination based on all of the evidence in the claim. 05 The com-
missioner sometimes "splits the difference" when there are differing
opinions as to the degree of the claimant's disability, or relies on
the independent examiner's opinion to make the award. Just as fre-
quently, however, the "Rule of Liberality" is applied somewhat per-
functorily, and the opinion finding the greatest disability is adopted
in the final order. Furthermore, the requirements for burden of proof
99. Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 364, 370, 234 S.E.2d 779,
783 (1977).
100. Bostic v. State Compensation Comm'r, 142 W. Va. 484, 487, 96 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1957).
101. Perry v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 602, 607-08, 165 S.E.2d
609, 612 (1969).
102. See, Harper, 160 W. Va. at 367, 234 S.E.2d at 781.
103. Kennedy v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 132, 134-35, 144 S.E.2d 509, 510-
11 (1965); Buckalew v. State Compensation Director, 149 W. Va. 239, 245, 140 S.E.2d 453, 456
(1965).
104. Estes v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 150 W. Va. 492, 494, 147 S.E.2d 400, 402
(1966).
105. Haines v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 152, 156, 150 S.E.2d 883,
885 (1966).
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can vary, from strict to very liberal, a situation which is aggravated
by the Rule of Liberality.' °6
3. Modifications
In contrast to the light burden of proof imposed upon the claim-
ant for a reopening, the standard to which an employer is held in
an application for modification is a stricter one. For example, a
PTD award cannot be set aside unless it affirmatively appears that
the claimant's present condition has "materially improved" over
that shown to exist when the PTD benefits were originally awarded. 10,
Showing that the claimant has returned to some other work is not
necessarily sufficient to have a PTD award modified. 108 It is rare
for the commissioner to grant an employer's application for mod-
ification of TTD benefits, even when there is evidence that the claim-
ant has reached his maximum degree of improvement. The
commissioner typically waits until the authorized treating physician
or the independent examiner finds that the claimant has reached his
maximum degree of medical improvement before terminating TTD.
Although the court has held that the employer and claimant are to
be afforded procedures "substantially similar" in their attempts to
obtain modifications and reopenings, 109 the relevant burdens of proof
produce a somewhat unlevel playing field, tilted in favor of claim-
ants.
C. The Appellate Process
The appeal procedure for reopenings and modifications is the
same as that for all workers' compensation matters. When a pro-
testable order is issued, the parties have thirty days in which to
object. 10 If an objection is filed, evidentiary hearings are held and
106. See, supra Ch. V, § B, Subsection 1.
107. Blosser v. State Compensation Comm'r, 132 W. Va. 112, 126, 51 S.E.2d 71, 78 (1948).
108. Linville v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 549, 556, 236 S.E.2d 41,
45 (1977).
109. Blosser v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 132 W. Va. 112, 123, 51 S.E.2d 71,
76-77 (1948).
110. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1. (1985 & Supp. 1989). Sixty days for appeal is the maximum permitted
"regardless of notice." Id.
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an appealable or "final" order is issued by the commissioner after
the parties have "submitted" the claim for decision. If there is no
appeal within thirty days after receipt of the final order, the com-
missioner's order becomes "forever final," since the time limits for
appeal are jurisdictional."'
1. The Appeal Board
Any party who feels "aggrieved," including the claimant, em-
ployer, or a dependent can, as a matter of right," 2 appeal any final
order of the commissioner to the Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board."' The commissioner is named as one of the appellees in
claims appealed to the Appeal Board.
.Briefs may be filed by the parties, 14 and oral arguments are
permitted before the Board." 5 The Board may affirm or reverse the
final order of the commissioner or, "for good cause shown," re-
mand the case to the commissioner "for the taking of such new,
additional, or further evidence as in the opinion of the board may
be necessary for a full and complete development of the facts of
the case.'""6 It may remand the case as often as is necessary,"17 and
can accept evidence or consider ex parte statements in support of
motions to remand. 118
The Appeal Board hears matters de novo;"'9 it does not merely
review questions of law. Although it rarely does so, the Board can
even take additional testimony.' 20 The Board displaces the commis-
111. Id.
112. An appeal to the Appeal Board is a matter of right; it is not granted for error. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 409, 151 S.E.2d 283 (1966).
113. W. VA. CoDa § 23-5-3. The Appeal Board is a three-member panel appointed by the gov-
ernor. Id. § 23-5-2 (1985).
114. Id. § 23-5-3 (1985 & Supp. 1989). The Appeal Board currently will not consider an appeal,
however, unless a brief is submitted by the appellant, where the appellant is represented by counsel.
115. Id. Presently a minority of appeals are argued orally and most of the arguments are short.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Dillon v. State Compensation Comm'r, 129 W. Va. 223, 226, 39 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1946).
120. See, e.g., Rasmus v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 117 W. Va. 55, 184 S.E. 250
(1936).
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sioner and becomes the sole fact-finding body in the case.12 1 The
findings and the presumptions of the commissioner wholly disap-
pear, and the order of the Board supersedes the commissioner's final
order for all purposes. 122
Generally, the Board does not accept new evidence. 23 The com-
missioner's level is a forum better suited for the submission of new
evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, and the building of a
record. The Board usually remands when further evidentiary de-
velopment is needed.'24
2. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
Either of the parties or the commissioner may apply to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for review of any final decision
by the Appeal Board. 125 Such an application must be made within
thirty days from the date of the Appeal Board's final decision.'26
The court then determines whether a review is to be granted. 27
The court's scope is limited; it should not disturb an Appeal
Board finding unless it determines that (i) the Appeal Board was
"clearly or plainly wrong,' ' 28 (ii) the Board's legal conclusions were
erroneous, 129 (iii) the Board's decision was not supported by the ev-
idence, 30 or (iv) the Appeal Board's ruling was clearly against the
121. Id. at 58, 184 S.E. at 252.
122. E.g., Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 359, 364, 163 S.E.2d
605, 608 (1968).
123. In one case, where the claimant had postponed a medical examination until eleven days
after the commissioner had denied his application to reopen for lack of proof, the court held that
the Appeal Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the medical report and In refusing
to remand the case back to the commissioner for evidentiary development. Willard v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 114, 181 S.E.2d 278 (1971).
124. In an appeal concerning reopenlings, the court has held that the Appeal Board has the power
only to determine whether the claim should be reopened, and cannot order the commissioner to give
a particular rating of disability which the Board fixes. Felty v. Compensation Comm'r, 124 W. Va.
75, 78, 19 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1942).
125. W. VA. CODE § 23-5-4 (Supp. 1989).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128, Eg., Backus v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 79, 83, 173 S.E.2d
353, 355 (1970).
129, Emmel v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 277, 284, 145 S.E.2d 29, 34 (1965).
130. E.g., Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 883, 888, 189 S.E.2d
838, 841 (1972).
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preponderance of the evidence.' The findings of fact by the Appeal
Board have the same weight as that accorded a trial judge.1 2 While
its scope of review has been defined as a limited one, in recent years
there has been a trend for the court to accept workers' compensation
claims for review, even where the findings of fact by the commis-
sioner and Appeal Board have been identical and were supported
by substantial evidence. Frequently, the Rule of Liberality is used
as the basis for reversing the order of the Appeal Board.13
A workers' compensation tribunal may only apply its own state's
law, 134 so it is almost unheard of for an appeal to proceed beyond
the state supreme court. Once the court has refused the appeal, or
reviews the case and issues an order, the litigation process usually
concludes. '35 Workers' compensation cases involving federal issues
are rarely heard at the federal level.136
VI. CONCLUSION
Claimants, employers, and dependents must follow a relatively
simple procedure to seek a change in previous workers' compen-
sation awards in West Virginia. A claimant must timely file his re-
opening petition and provide some evidence of a progression or
aggravation of his compensable condition or provide some new fact
or facts. To succeed with an application for modification, an em-
ployer must disclose a cause for adjustment and provide some new
131. See, e.g., Barkley v. State Workmen's Compensation Commr, 164 W. Va. 777, 266 S.E.2d
456 (1980).
132. W. VA. CoDE § 23-5-4a (1985).
133. See supra note 93.
134. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) rev'g 598 F.2d 617 (4th Cir.
1979) (unpublished opinion).
135. In 1983, 116 workers' compensation petitions were filed with the court, 75.49% being granted.
In 1984, 162 workers' Compensation petitions were filed with 80.26% being granted. In 1985, 198
were filed and 55.5% were granted. In 1986, 421 were filed with 56.58% granted. In 1987, 841 were
filed with 47.92% granted. In 1988, 488 workers' compensation petitions were filed with 56.85% of
those being granted for hearing. Workers' compensation claims represented 10%fo of all of the cases
the court considered in 1983; 12.6% in 1984; 14.4% in 1985; 26.5% in 1986; 43.7% in 1987, and
30% in 1988. Telephone interview with Ancil 0. Ramey, Clerk of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals (January 17, 1990). Most of the court's workers' compensation decisions are issued in
per curiam, unpublished form.
136. See, e.g., Cobb v. Unison Transformer Services, Inc., No. 2:88-1404, (S.D. W. Va. 1989).
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fact not considered by the commissioner. A two-tiered appellate sys-
tem is available to litigants dissatisfied with final reopening or mod-
ification orders by the commissioner.
Although West Virginia workers' compensation law purports to
provide both the claimant and the employer with an equivalent sys-
tem for amending previous awards, in practical terms that is not
the result. Because of various procedural provisions and the Rule
of Liberality, the claimant has a much lighter burden of proof than
the employer. The Rule of Liberality pervades all workers' com-
pensation litigation issues in West Virginia; it has generated in-
creased awards to claimants who have provided minimal evidence
of progression or aggravation of their compensable conditions.
Employers are proponents of a more equitable liberality rule,
such as the federal black lung "True Doubt Rule." The workers'
compensation system, in and of itself, is different from other areas
of civil law. It is intended to be remedial in nature. Both claimants
and employers gained protection and lost privileges when the work-
ers' compensation systems were established in the United States early
in this century. The employer gained protection from nearly all em-
ployee lawsuits pertaining to occupational injuries and diseases, and
some predictability as to the cost of such claims. In exchange for
surrendering the right to sue, the claimant gained a system financed
by employers where he did not have to prove fault and where the
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
and the Fellow Servant Rule were not applicable; that was the "trade-
off." As a result of the unique nature of workers' compensation,
res judicata and collateral estoppel rarely apply.
There is constant discussion in West Virginia concerning the pos-
sibilities of modifying both the liberal reopening provisions and the
Rule of Liberality, because of skyrocketing costs. Perhaps it is time
for the Legislature to revisit these issues to determine what changes
can be made to restore a more level playing field for all parties.
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